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ABSTRACT 
 
This note is about the possibility of a stalemate in a continuing conflict. 
Following the prevailing economic literature on the topic, under some 
assumptions, the outcome of a conflict can be described in two ways: (i) a 
predetermined split of a contested output; (ii) a winner-take-all contest where 
the winning agent is capable to grab all the contested stake. By contrast, in 
reality many disputes do not have a clear or a definite outcome. A stalemate can 
end the conflict with the result of a draw. To allow for a stalemate, some formal 
modifications to the classical Hirshleifer’s model of conflict are needed. In 
particular, the possibility of a stalemate can be captured through a modified 
form of the Contest Success Function as axiomatized by Blavatskyy (2004). 
Under the possibility of a stalemate, the scenario exhibits a higher level of ‘guns’ 
than Hirshleifer’s classical model. At the same time, it also exhibits a lower 
degree of entropy.  
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Introduction 
This note is about the possibility of a stalemate in a continuing conflict. A 
conflict can be defined as: a destructive interaction which involves strategic 
interdependent decisions in the presence of coercion and anarchy. Jack 
Hirshleifer pioneered the work on modeling conflict, whose foundations are in 
Hirshleifer (1987, 1988, and 1989). The economic theory of conflict1 rests upon 
the assumption that agents involved in conflict interactions have to choose an 
optimal level of resources devoted to the unproductive activity of conflict which 
is necessarily detrimental for welfare. The stake of the conflict is interpreted as a 
joint production which depends on the productive efforts of the agents and the 
cost function is represented by the foregone production.  
Following the prevailing literature, under some assumptions the outcome 
of a conflict can be described in two ways: (i) a predetermined split of the 
contested output; (ii) a winner-take-all contest where the winning agent is 
capable to grab all the contested stake. In both cases the outcome of conflict is 
definite and have a clear outcome. By contrast, in reality many disputes do not 
have a clear or a definite outcome. A stalemate can end the conflict with the 
result of a draw. The occurrence of stalemates is a common feature of 
international interactions. As can be simply verified in the Militarized 
Interstates Disputes dataset maintained within the Correlates of War2 project at 
the Pennsylvania State University2, a large part of militarized disputes (40%) 
over the period 1816-2001 resulted in a stalemate. A stalemate shapes a scenario 
where there is neither a clear victory of one party nor an effective conflict 
resolution mechanism.    
To allow for a stalemate some formal modifications to the classical 
Hirshleifer’s model of conflict are needed. In particular, cornerstone of the 
economic literature on conflict is the Contest Success Function (henceforth CSF 
for brevity).3 Therefore, the existence of a stalemate can be captured through a 
modified form of the CSF as axiomatized by Blavatskyy (2004). 
 The paper is organised as follows: in a first section the Hirshleifer’s basic 
model will be expounded. It is slightly modified with respect to the original 
version. This does not affect the main classical results. In a second section, the 
classical basic model is enriched in order to capture the emergence of a 
stalemate. In a third section, results of the foregoing sections are simply 
compared in order to highlight the impact of a possibility of a stalemate upon 
the destructiveness of conflict. Eventually the concept of statistical entropy will 
be applied as a novel measurement tools for conflicts. A final section 
summarizes the results and provides a tentative interpretation of the results.     
                                                 
1 In more recent years several studies extended Hirshleifer’s basic model. See among 
others: Grossman (1991/1998), Skaperdas (1992), Neary (1997), Anderton et al. (1999), 
Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000), Dixit (2004), Spolaore (2004), Caruso (2006). The 
literature on the economics of conflict has been recently surveyed and deeply 
expounded in Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007). 
2 The dataset is available at http://cow2.la.psu.edu/ (accessed March 2007). See also 
Bremer at al. (2004). 
3 Selective seminal contributions are by Tullock (1980), O’Keeffe et al. (1984), Rosen 
(1986) and Dixit (1987). See then Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998) for a 
basic axiomatization. See also Amegashie (2006) and Peng (2006). 
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HIRSHLEIFER’S CLASSICAL MODEL OF CONFLICT 
In the classical Hirshleifer’s model of continuing conflict two risk-neutral agents 
indexed by  2,1=i  make simultaneous (à la Nash-Cournot) and once-and-for-all 
choices about their own allocation of resources between ‘butter’ and ‘guns’. Each 
agent is endowed with an initial positive endowment of resources, ( )∞∈ ,0iR , 
which can be converted into ‘guns’, or ‘butter’ according a Resources Partition 
Equation defined by: 
 
iii ygR +=           (1) 
 
where  ( )∞∈ ,0ig and ( )∞∈ ,0iy  denote ‘guns’ and ‘butter’ respectively. A 
contestable output – say the ‘pie’ - is determined through an aggregate 
production function, denoted by y , which is a simple linear additive function: 
 ( ) 2121 , yyyyy +=          (2) 
 
Then, the resources allocated to productive activities determine a total 
contestable output, that is to be distributed according the resources allocated to 
‘guns’. Let me assume that agent 1 has a larger initial endowment than agent 2: 
21 RR > . In particular, for sake of simplicity I set 11 =R whereas agent 2‘s 
endowment is assumed to be a fraction ( )1,0∈δ such that δδ == 12 RR . 
Eventually the contestable ‘pie’ becomes: 
 
δ+−−= 211 ggy           (3) 
 
The outcome of the conflict is determined through a Contest Success Function. 
It summarizes the relevant aspects of what Hirshleifer defines the technology of 
conflict. In particular, even if the CSF can take different forms, I apply the ratio 
form of the CSF. 
 
( )
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i
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gggp +=21 ,   for 21,=i and ij ≠      (4) 
 
Equation (4) is differentiable and follows the conditions below: 
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The functional form adopted in equation (4) implies that there is no 
preponderance of an agent over the other. This is of course a limiting 
assumption, even if many conflicts fall in this category. Under the assumption of 
risk-neutrality the outcome of the CSF can also denote the proportion of a 
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deterministic appropriation of the ‘pie’ going to agent i for 2,1=i . Eventually, 
the income distribution equations for both agents are given by: 
 ( )( )δ−−−= 2221 1, ggggpW ii        (5)  
 
The first order conditions for a maximum are: 
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The second order conditions are: 
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Therefore, the optimal allocations to ‘guns’ in the classical continuing conflict 
scenario are given by: 
 ( )
4
1*
2
*
1
δ+== gg          (8) 
 
Note that - as Hirshleifer noted in his seminal paper –there will be a critical 
resource ratio 21 /RR at which the poorer agent devotes all its resources to 
fighting – namely corner solutions emerge. Then, it would be possible to say 
that there is a critical interval ( )*,0 δ  such that for ( )*,0 δδ ∈  there is room for 
corner solutions. In this simple case the upper bound is given by 3/1* =δ . Total 
level of ‘guns’ is simply defined as: 
 ( )
2
1*
2
*
1
δ+=+= ggTG         (9) 
 
And the level of joint production is given by: 
 
( ) ( )
2
1, 21
δ+=yyy          (10) 
 
Eventually, in the interior Nash equilibrium the incomes for agent 1 and agent 2 
are:  
 ( )
4
1*
2
*
1
δ+==WW          (11) 
 
Summarizing, in the classical continuing conflict scenario conflict appears to be 
as a redistributive activity. The poorer agent will invest more in ‘guns’. This is 
the Hirshleifer’s argument of Paradox of Power. The conflict imposes a wastage 
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of resources since that half of the endowments are devoted to ‘guns’ and 
consequently  the size of the ‘pie’ shrinks.       
 
CONFLICT AND STALEMATE 
Hereafter I shall slightly modify Hirshleifer’s basic model by means of a 
particular functional form of the CSF. It has been axiomatized by Blavatskyy 
(2004). This functional from admits the possibility that a stalemate can emerge 
between agents. The CSF takes the following form: 
 
2,1,
1
~
21
1 =++= igg
gp
ss
s
is         (12) 
 
Where the subscripts ‘s’ denote the scenario with the possibility of a stalemate. 
The (12) follows the conditions presented in (4.1) but note that the probability of 
a stalemate is given by: 
 
( ) ( )
21
212211 1
1,~,~1
gg
ggpggp ssss ++=−−       (13) 
 
Hence, the income redistribution equations become: 
 ( )( )δ−−−= 2121 1,~ ggggpU sii        (14) 
 
The first order conditions for a maximum are:  
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And the second order conditions are given by: 
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The symmetric interior Nash equilibrium solutions for guns are given by: 
 
( )
8
22012 2
1
2
*
2
*
1
−+++== δδδgg        (17) 
 
Note that 1*1 <g whereas 43.*2 >⇔< δδg . Hence, also in this case there is a 
critical interval ( )**,0 δ  such that for ( )**,0 δδ ∈  there is room for corner 
solutions. In this case the upper bound is given by 43.** =δ . In this symmetric 
equilibrium incomes of both agents are: 
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In equilibrium  the total level of guns is given by: 
 
( )
4
22012 2
1
2
*
2
*
1
−+++=+= δδδsss ggTG       (19) 
 
and the final joint production is given by: 
 
( ) ( )
4
2012231
2
1
2 ++−+=−+= δδδδ ss TGy      (20) 
 
COMPARISON AND MEASUREMENT 
Results of the foregoing section allows for a simple comparison between the two 
scenarios. First, consider the level of guns. In both scenarios, both agents devote 
the same amount of resources to ‘guns’, but in a conflict under the possibility of 
stalemate they arm more. Namely 2,1,** => igg iis . Trivial to say that TGTGs > . 
Moreover, in spite of a higher level of ‘guns’ the probability of winning the 
conflict  is lower under the possibility of a stalemate. Namely 2,1,~ ** =< ipp iis , 
where *~isp and 
*
ip  are (12) and (4) evaluated in equilibrium respectively. Note 
also that differently form classical basic model under the possibility of a 
stalemate the total level of guns is no longer equal to the final level of 
production, ss yTG ≠ . In particular, ss yTG > , that is the total amount of 
resources devoted to fighting is higher than the level of the final joint 
production.     
Eventually let me use a simple index of intensity of violence (DV ). By 
intensity of violence I mean the ratio of total level of guns on the sum of 
endowments. In formal terms it is possible to write: 
 
( )δ+= 1
TGDV           (21) 
 
It is clear that in the basic model 2/1=IV whereas in the presence of a stalemate 
it is given by: 
 
( )
( )δ
δδδ
+
−+++=
14
22012 2
1
2
sDV        (22) 
 
Then, the intensity of violence is unambiguously higher in the second scenario: 
IVIVs > . Last but not least, another point of interest is the critical interval for 
δ allowing for corner solutions. In particular note that *** δδ > . This means that 
under the possibility of a stalemate even a less unequal resources endowments 
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can lead to the corner solution where the poorer agent devote all its resources to 
fighting. To summarise it would be possible to write: 
 
PROPOSITION 1: Consider a conflict when agents are equal in their fighting 
abilities and the conflict is not decisive. Therefore: (i) the possibility of a 
stalemate makes the conflict more destructive. Formally TGTGs > ; (ii) each 
agent attains a lower probability of winning the conflict. Formally 
2,1,~ ** =< ipp iis ; (iii) the range of the Nash interior equilibrium shrinks and  
there is a larger room for corner solutions at which the poorer party invest all 
its resources in ‘guns’.  
 
However, a conflict can be susceptible of further measurement and evaluation. 
In Caruso (2007a) and Caruso (2007b) I proposed a novel measurement to 
analyze the realm of conflicts. An appealing idea can be related to those of 
disorder and randomness. In fact, since conflict is a destructive interaction 
between two or more parties, it seems reasonable to consider also the degree of 
uncertainty it spreads. In actual violent appropriative conflicts, uncertainty 
about the final outcome does clearly constitute a characteristic element that 
should be considered in developing devices to solve the conflict itself. In order 
to capture the degree of uncertainty and disorder I apply the idea of statistical 
entropy which is commonly adopted in communication theory and physical 
sciences.4 The famous reference is the work of Shannon and Weaver (1949), 
which posed the quantitative foundations of information theory. Hence, entropy 
is defined as:  
 
1
1
( ,..., ) ln ,
n
n i i
i
E p p k p p
=
= − ∑         (23) 
 
where k  is an arbitrary constant which can be set to unity without loss of 
generality.5 The greatest disorder would occur when all outcomes have the same 
probability, i.e. 1/ip n=  for 1,...i n= . The degree of disorder is given by: 
(1/ ,...,1/ ) lnE n n k n= . For instance, in the limiting case of 2n =  and 1k =  the 
degree of disorder will be given by ln(2)E = . However, it would also be more 
useful to introduce the concept of relative entropy. Relative entropy is defined 
as the ratio of the actual to the maximum entropy in a system. That is, it would 
be useful to recognize the extent to which the degree of disorder approaches the 
maximum level attainable. In formal terms it is possible to write the relative 
entropy as: / ( )RE E Ln n= . Then, relative entropy in classical model of 
continuing conflict will exactly reaches its maximum level, namely ( ) 1, *2*1 =ppRE , 
whereas under the possibility of a stalemate it will be  
                                                 
4 Consider, among others, some applications of entropy to social sciences: the Nobel 
graduate in physic Dennis Gabor applied entropy to the measurement of social and 
economic freedom in Gabor and Gabor (1958). Entropy has also been proposed as a 
measure of competitiveness and diversification in market structure: see Attaran and 
Zwick (1989) and Horowitz and Horowitz (1968). 
5 The form adopted here is the one presented in Campiglio (1999), ch.4. 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) )3(2
)2(102222~,~ *2
*
1 LnD
LnDDLnDDLnDppRE sss ++
−+−++++−−+−+= δ
δδδδδ
 (24) 
where ( ) D=++ 212 2012δδ  for compactness. Note that relative entropy is 
inversely related to the degree of asymmetry in initial resources endowment. 
Being narrative, the more the agents are equal in their initial endowments the 
more turbulent appears to be the scenario under the possibility of a stalemate. 
To summarize: 
 
Proposition 2: Consider a conflict when agents are equal in their fighting 
abilities and the conflict is not decisive. Therefore (i) the conflict under the 
possibility of a stalemate appears to be less turbulent than the classical model 
of conflict where relative entropy reaches its maximum level; (ii) the degree of 
turbulence is inversely related with the parameter capturing the asymmetry in 
the initial endowment. The more the agents are similar the more turbulent 
appears to be the scenario.   
 
 
PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
This brief note was intended to shed light on particular aspect of conflict 
interactions. The emergence of stalemate in conflict interactions. In fact, 
differently from political science the economic theory of conflict disregarded the 
occurrence of a stalemate. This analysis is grounded upon a particular 
functional form of CSF as expounded in Blavatskyy (2004). The point of interest 
is that this kind of scenario exhibits a higher intensity of violence. The rationale 
should be that agents try to avoid the emergence of a stalemate and then 
increase their own level of ‘guns’ in order to increase their own probability of 
winning. A higher level of ‘guns’ clearly makes the interaction more destructive 
than the classical Hirshleifer’s basic model. Albeit interesting, this note is 
nothing but a very preliminary result which has to be considered as a ‘spare 
part’ of a further analysis of conflicts.  
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